The Holy See announced Monday the suppression of a Chinese mainland diocese and the creation of another, along with the consecration of the new see’s first bishop.
The announcements bundled two decisions made by Pope Francis regarding diocesan territory last year along with the installation of the new bishop, which took place on January 20.
But what does the latest round of diocesan restructuring for the mainland tell us about the recently renewed Vatican-China deal?
If, as the Vatican maintains, slow progress is being made with Beijing, can Chinese Catholics see it that way — or will they just see the Church making painful steps on a road to nowhere?
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As statements go, that narrative is probably best described as essentially true, but incomplete.
In reality, the diocesan restructuring — which saw four Chinese counties carved out of the former Fenyang territory and assigned to other sees — was the latest such move in a larger project to redraw the diocesan map of the mainland to better align with state jurisdictional boundaries at the municipal and regional levels.
While Francis may have approved the decision, and his approval is certainly necessary for the suppression and erection of the dioceses to be valid, the overwhelming likelihood is that it will have been presented to the Vatican as something the state was committed to seeing happen, with or without the pope’s agreement, as they have done in the past.
In this sense, it is certainly fair to say that avoiding an invalid and schismatic diocesan reorganization from taking place “promotes” the pastoral care and spiritual good of local Catholics, inasmuch as it avoids actively harming them.
And the installation of Bishop Ji Weizhong — a former priest of the former Diocese of Fenyang — by mutual agreement between Rome and Beijing, is similarly better than either of the obvious alternatives: his illicit consecration and unilateral installation by the CCP, or leaving the diocese vacant for an indefinite period.
But it is also worth noting two significant details. The first is that, according to the Vatican’s statement, Pope Francis approved the diocesan changes in October, in the days immediately following the renewal of the Vatican-China deal for a new, extended, period of four years. The second is that it was only announced alongside Bishop Ji’s consecration, on the day it happened.
In the ordinary run of events in the Vatican, major changes to dioceses are not kept under wraps for months, and new bishops are not normally “appointed” on the day of their consecration. Yet, in the course of such events in China, things like that have become increasingly common practice.
A critical assessment of this state of affairs might conclude that Beijing continues to have the whip hand in its partnership with Rome on episcopal appointments, with the Vatican scrambling to keep pace with (and approve) the CCP’s decisions as they are made.
Such a view might appear to rhyme with comments made earlier this month by the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Parolin — often held out as the chief cheerleader, if not mastermind, of the Vatican-China deal.
Asked an unusually direct question by official Vatican media about the "controversial" deal’s progress and the impression of “weakness” many have of Rome’s position, the cardinal said that he was “not shocked by differing views [on the deal], as some may believe.”
“Other solutions may exist” for the Vatican’s approach to Chinese relations, the cardinal conceded. But “the Holy See deemed this agreement to be the most effective solution to begin a dialogue with one of the key issues on the table… the appointment of bishops.”
Parolin acknowledged with surprising frankness that the chosen “solution” was “progressing slowly—sometimes even taking a step backwards” and “not always successful” with its two main goals: ensuring that all Chinese bishops are in formal communion with the pope and “ensuring some degree of normalization” for the daily life of the local Church.
Instances of “backward steps” are not hard to come by: apart from the ongoing persecution of faithful Catholics, including some bishops, in 2022, the Chinese state unilaterally effected the resignation of Bishop John Peng Weizhao from his diocese and his “transfer” to become an auxiliary in a new “diocese” of Jiangxi created by the CCP.
But Parolin also said that the “slow and challenging journey” of the Vatican-China deal “is beginning to bear some fruit.” Still, he conceded, “these fruits might not yet be visible.”
And the most charitable survey of the last 18 months might offer that at least some progress is visible.
The previous practice of Beijing naming, installing, and announcing new bishops without reference to Rome — daring the Vatican not to retroactively approve the moves — has largely ceased, even if the new normal seems to be affording the pope the minimal courtesy of real-time notice of such decisions.
And, after the still unresolved debacle of 2022, this week’s Fenyang/Lüliang announcement is the latest of a few examples of the Church and Chinese state working together to “tidy up” the ecclesiastical map of the mainland.
Similarly, while most of the new episcopal appointments in China, including the newly minted Bishop Ji, come with impeccable pro-state credentials, last year Beijing took the unprecedented step of recognizing an underground mainland bishop as the legitimate leader of his diocese.
But a lurking question remains: how much practical progress can the Vatican make in China when the best it seems to be able to hope for is a courtesy call before major decisions are announced?
No matter how many new bishops — or dioceses — are created according to a “normal” process in line with the Vatican-China deal’s norms, they won’t be enough to regularize the situation of Bishop Peng and the non-diocese of Xiangji. And even if Beijing agrees to recognize a dozen or more formerly-underground bishops as the legitimate heads of their dioceses, it won’t ipso facto free a single cleric still detained by the authorities.
And while the sight earlier this month of the state-approved Bishop of Shanghai baptizing 54 new Catholics is heartening — and evidence of some real growth of the faith in his diocese — it doesn’t erase the fact (or significance) of Bishop Shin having effectively transferred himself to Shanghai in 2023.
Local Catholics are not unaware of these moves. Nor are they unable to for a reasonable assessment of who is the ultimate power in the Church in China — the pope or the CCP.
And Chinese Catholics are far more aware of the significance of the Church’s institutional cooperation with the CCP, even while the government perpetrates acts of genocide against the Uyghur people and cracks down on civil liberties in Hong Kong.
While it is perhaps understandable that figures like Parolin choose to hail “slow progress” even amid “backward steps,” the Vatican-China deal continues to pile up a mounting number of inconsistencies, institutional and moral, for Chinese Catholics to see.
The ultimate question is, will all these inconsistencies add up to the Church becoming a sign of contradiction in China, in the worst possible way? And what impact will that have on the faith of Chinese Catholics?
