Official: Ukrainian Orthodox Church must cut ties with Moscow

"The only requirement is to sever ties with the Moscow Patriarch."

A Ukrainian government official has said that a new law banning activity by the Russian Orthodox Church will not apply to Ukrainian Orthodox Church bishops affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, as long as they clearly and definitively cut ties with Moscow.

Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and Metropolitan Onufriy, Primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, visit Amman in 2019. Credit: RISU.

“The [Ukrainian Orthodox] Church can continue to exist,” said Victor Yelenskyi, head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience.

“The only requirement is to sever ties with the Moscow Patriarch, who is actively involved in propaganda supporting the war against Ukraine. We are not talking about banning a Church for the actions of a few dozen collaborators. The requirement is to cut ties with those who inspired those collaborators,” Yelenskyi told The Pillar.

“The UOC-MP could appeal to the global Orthodox community and explain why it cannot remain part of the Moscow Patriarchate, preserving its canonical status until a council can be convened to address this issue. We are not talking about self-proclaiming autocephaly,” he continued.

The new law, signed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy August 24, effectively bars activity by the Russian Orthodox Church within its borders.   

It also requires the Ukrainian Orthodox Church connected to the Moscow Patriarchate to completely sever all ties with the patriarchate in the next nine months.

The legislation prohibits the activities of foreign religious organizations that are “located in a state that has been recognized as having committed or as committing armed aggression against Ukraine and/or temporarily occupying part of the territory of Ukraine,” those that “directly or indirectly (including through public statements by their leaders or other governing bodies) support armed aggression against Ukraine,” or those “whose governing center is located outside Ukraine in the relevant aggressor state.”

To date, the Ukrainian parliament has only recognized Russia as such a state.

Although several religious organizations operating in Ukraine are connected to Russia to varying degrees, the law specifically mentions the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The law describes this Church as “an ideological continuation of the regime of the aggressor state, an accomplice to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on behalf of the Russian Federation and the ideology of the ‘Russkiy mir.’”

Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill has become an increasingly controversial figure in the last two years, defending the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an invasion which he explicitly claimed is “holding back the anti-Christ.”

As a result of his support for Russia’s attack on Ukraine, several countries have sought to restrict the activities of the Moscow Patriarchate in the past two years.

In early September 2022, the Latvian parliament passed a law requiring the Latvian Orthodox Church to become completely independent from Moscow. Similar processes are taking place in Estonia.

There is also ongoing discussion in Moldova about banning the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia have banned certain representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church from entering their territories, suspecting them of collaborating with Russian intelligence services.

Ukraine, however, has an additional layer of nuance, as it is home to the largest Moscow Patriarchate structure outside of Russia — the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), or UOC-MP.

In May 2022, the UOC-MP asserted its independence, although it initially insisted that it was not formally breaking from ecclesial communion with the Russian Orthodox Church. 

Under the new law, the UOC-MP will have nine months to sever any proven ties with the Moscow Patriarchate. If these ties are not terminated, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience will file a lawsuit against the UOC-MP in court, potentially leading to a ban.

Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, authorities have opened more than 100 criminal cases against UOC-MP priests and bishops, with 26 of these cases already resulting in court sentences, according to the Security Service of Ukraine. These cases primarily involve charges of treason, collaboration, and aiding and abetting Russia.

The new law has met with widespread approval in Ukraine. Opinion polls show that more than 80% of Ukrainians believe the state should intervene in the activities of the UOC-MP to some extent, and 63% support a complete ban on its activities.

Sources familiar with the discussions within the Ukrainian government indicate that the law was passed largely due to public opinion and the personal favor of the president, whose stance on many issues has become more hardline in recent months.

A commission of experts, established in 2023 by the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience, ruled that the UOC-MP is still part of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Russian Orthodox Church, in its own statutes, refers to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as being within its fold.

However, Metropolitan Klyment, head of the Information and Education Department of the UOC-MP, rejected this claim, saying in comments to the media that he does not believe the law should apply to his Church.

He noted that the UOC-MP has changed its statutory documents, which are registered with the state, to reflect its declaration of separation from the Russian Orthodox Church in 2022. The UOC-MP no longer views itself as subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, he said, regardless of the views of the patriarchate on the subject.

Yelenskyi defended the new law, telling The Pillar that “restricting the activities of a religious organization in Ukraine that openly seeks to destroy Ukrainian statehood, language, culture, identity, and even Ukrainians themselves is a legitimate goal.”

He added that the law can be appealed by religious organizations that believe it to be unfairly applied to them.

Before its passage, the bill underwent intense debates in parliament, delaying its eventual passage. It was also widely debated in Ukrainian society and the international community. It received nearly 900 pages of amendments and comments.

Some of these regarded questions as to whether the legislation would threaten religious freedom.

But Yelenskyi contended that the law as passed does not place an undue burden on people’s consciences.

“I believe that, for example, requiring Catholics to break ties with the pope would burden their conscience, as this is part of the Catholic faith,” he said. “However, the connection with the Moscow Patriarch is not part of Orthodox doctrine.”

Priests of the UOC-MP have largely been reluctant to comment on the new law.

One priest from central Ukraine, who asked not to be named, told The Pillar that he had received the new law with mixed feelings, and that the views of his parishioners are split.

He said he expects an official condemnation of the “Russkyi mir” ideology by the leadership of the UOC-MP. He also suggested that involving an external arbitrator, such as the Ecumenical Patriarch, could help ease tensions and contribute to resolving the issue.

Some members of the UOC-MP are now advocating for the publication of a formal letter to the Russian Orthodox Church, declaring a withdrawal from communion.

A statement signed by more than 400 priests and lay persons from the UOC-MP asks for such a letter to formalize the 2022 decision to declare independence from Moscow.